Qatar is currently the highest emitter per capita and targets emission reduction by exercising tight controls on gas flaring. In order to limit the emission under allowances, the power plants have two options: investing in carbon capture and storage (CCS) systems or buying carbon credits for the excess emissions above their allowances. However, CCS systems are expensive for installation and operation. In this paper, a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model is developed for the design of integrated carbon capture, transport and storage infrastructure in Qatar under carbon trading scheme. We first investigate the critical carbon credit prices to decide under which price it is more beneficial to invest on CCS systems or to buy carbon credits via carbon trading. Then the fair design of the CCS infrastructure is obtained under two fairness scenarios: the same saving ratio and the game theory Nash approach. Fair cost distribution among power plants in Qatar is obtained by selecting the CO2 resources (power plants) to be captured with available capture technologies and materials, designing the transportation pipeline network to connect the resources with the sequestration and/or utilisation sites and determining the carbon trading price and amount among power plants. Under different fairness scenarios, the total costs are slightly higher than that from minimising the total cost to obtain the fair cost distribution. Power plants with higher CO2 emissions determine to install CCS system, while other power plants buy the carbon credits from domestic or international market to fulfil their carbon allowance requirements. The future work includes extending the current model by considering power generation distribution and designing the pipeline network with the selection of pump locations and pipe diameters.
Introduction
Increasing greenhouse gas emission (GHG) is considered as one of the main reasons for global warming. Reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from energy system involves reforestation, energy efficiency enhancement, fuel substitution, utilisation of low-carbon technologies and carbon capture and storage (CCS) (Chicco and Stephenson, 2012) . One more CO2 reduction method is known as carbon capture and conversion (CCC), which recovers CO2 to synthesise useful products through chemical transformation (Taheri Najafabadi, 2015) . CCS enables the continued use of fossil fuels which accounts for over 80% of global total primary energy consumption (Anantharaman et al., 2013) and CCS is recognised as an attractive option for CO2 abatement on a large scale from centralised energy systems. Three main steps are included in CCS: CO2 capture from gaseous combustion, CO2 transportation and CO2 storage in reservoirs. In power generation section, CO2 emissions can be captured by pre-combustion technique, after combustion technique or the oxyfuel process.
CO2 transportation, which connects the capture and sequestration, can apply carbon pipeline, ships or road tankers. Pipe line transport is ideal for large-scale and long-distance. Captured CO2 can be stored in sinks with different geological formations, such as deep saline formations, depleted oil and gas reservoirs (with or without enhanced oil recovery) and deep unmineable coal seams (Middleton and Bielicki, 2009a) .
The optimal design of the CCS system has been investigated in several recent studies around the world. A toolbox integrating ArcGIS and MARKAL is developed to assess the development of a large-scale CO2 infrastructure in the Netherlands for 2010 -2050 (van den Broek et al., 2009 . Three different CCS infrastructure systems are assessed for six EU member states: Begium, Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia in (Kjärstad et al., 2011) . Middleton and Bielicki (2009b) introduce a comprehensive model, simCCS, to solve for optimal spatial deployment of the CCS infrastructure. It minimises the annual cost by determining the pipeline network between CO2 sources and sinks. Then a fivestep process for developing a candidate pipeline network is introduced based on the simCCS model (Middleton et al., 2012) . Tan et al. (2012) present a continuous-time mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model to match CO2 sources and sinks in CCS systems while considering the storage limitations of the sinks. A multi-period MILP model is also proposed by them (Tan et al., 2013) to match CO2 sources and inks under the constraints of temporal, injection rate and storage capacity. Weihs et al. (2011) develop an optimisation model for CCS pipeline networks to minimise the network cost with a genetic algorithm. The model is 3 applied to design the CCS network for the south eastern Queensland region in Australia. An optimisation model, InfraCCS model, is described by Morbee et al (2012) , which minimises the cost of a CO2 transport network at European scale for -2050 issues, including economies of scale, infrastructure ownership and political incentives, are analysed within the existing CO2 transport infrastructure in (Brunsvold et al., 2011) . What is more, utilisation and disposal of CO2 is included in a scalable and comprehensive CCS infrastructure model introduced by Han and Lee (2011) . Hasan et al. (2014; design a CO2 capture, utilisation and sequestration (CCUS) supply chain network to minimise the cost by selecting the source plants, capture processes, capture materials, CO2 pipelines, locations of utilisation sites and amounts of CO2 storage.
The major challenge toward large-scale deployment of CCS is its high cost, while carbon trading approach is proposed for emission control from economic incentives. It refers to the trading of emissions of six major GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphurhexafluoride (SF6). There are several mandatory emissions trading schemes under operation, which are European Union Emissions Trading system (EU ETS), Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (USA), New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme, Tokyo metropolitan trading scheme and the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (Australia) (Perdan and Azapagic, 2011) . Among them, USA has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1998). Uddin and Holtedahl (2013) classify the emission trading schemes into three groups: 'cap-and-trade', 'rate-based' and 'project-based'. The international emissions trading under Kyoto Protocol allows for less costly emissions abatement than domestic actions alone. Emission reductions are expected to take place where the cost of reduction is the lowest. The EU ETS is the largest multinational emission trading scheme in the world, and the governments agree on the national emission caps allocating the allowances to their industrial emitters (Rebennack et al., 2009) . Compared with the carbon taxation method which has a fixed price, the ETS permits are traded by the market participants and the cost of emissions is determined by market forces (Villoria-Sáez et al., 2016) . In the carbon trading system, cap and trade system is commonly used approach where each entity is placed a cap of CO2 emissions and receives an allowance that is equal to its individual cap value (Chaabane et al., 2012) . These entities can sell or buy the allowances if they have lower or higher CO2 emissions than the cap values on a yearly base. From the cost-effective aspect, the carbon trading system encourages these entities to reduce CO2 emissions by investing in more effective technology or utilising renewable 4 energy (Üçtuğ et al., 2014) . These entities often have two options: installing their own CCS system and buying carbon credits for the excess emissions above the allowance. As a result of carbon trading scheme, the cash flows of power plants become dependent on the emission amount during operation and the price of carbon trading (Koo et al., 2011) . On the other hand, the CCS installation depends on both internal and external conditions: its own performance effectiveness, economics, emission reduction target and unit price of emission allowance. The carbon trading price can be determined by the supply and demand of the allowances as any commodity market (Li et al., 2015) . Allowance allocation is one of the most important policy design issues in emission trading, since the initial allocation of permits affects both fairness and market efficiency. Three major methods are available for allowance allocation: auction, criteria exogenous to the firm receiving the permits and output-based allocation (Liu et al., 2012) . In this work, the allowance allocation problem is not considered, while the allowances are assumed to be provided in advance.
'Fairness' is not commonly defined and Mathies and Gudergan (2011) suggest the definition of fairness as the reasonable, acceptable or just judgment of an outcome which the process used to arrive. The fair solution suggests that all game participants can receive an acceptable or 'fair' portion of benefits. Equality, equity and exemption are considered as different but complementary notions of distributive fairness for burden sharing in international climate policy (Ringius et al., 2002) . Equality means all players should have equal obligations.
Equity means the costs is distributed proportionally. Exemption means the poorest countries just provide moral support instead of material contributions. Responsibilities, capabilities and needs are frequently invoked as interpretations of equity for climate change negotiation (Underdal and Wei, 2015) . Five equity criterial are used to locate carbon emission reduction target to model economic performance of interprovincial CO2 emission reduction quota trading in China, which are CO2 emissions, energy consumption, population, GDP and per capita GDP (Zhou et al., 2013) . Different marginal abatement cost curves across different provinces are constructed and applied in their work. Game theory has been applied to find the 'fair' solution, where the fair solution suggests that all game participants can receive an acceptable or 'fair' portion of benefits. A cooperative game is proposed by Rosenhal (2008) to determine the transfer prices for the intermediate products in the supply chain to allocate the net profit in a fair manner. Nash bargaining framework from cooperative Game theory has been applied for 'fair' solution in different areas, such as resources allocation problems 5 and fair profit sharing among enterprises (Ganji et al., 2007; Gjerdrum et al., 2001; Gjerdrum et al., 2002; Yaiche et al., 2000) .
Qatar is currently the highest emitter per capita, 79.3 tons per capita (Dargin, 2010) , and is concerned with taking responsibility in carbon emission reduction. Fig. 1 Council (GCC) member to join the World Bank's Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) project which targets emission reduction by exercising tight controls on gas flaring. CCS is considered as a solution among others since it will allow Qatar to continue using the cost effective energy sources, fossil fuel, while reducing carbon emissions to the atmosphere.
Although there are high emission rates in the Gulf states, the carbon trading are stated as enormous and would cut down the CO2 emissions while generation revenue for renewable energy projects (Qatar Energy & Industry Sector, 2012) . projected allowance prices will support the CCS deployment without the bonuses. CO2 allowances are considered in a CO2 value chain optimisation work for the Norwegian continental shelf (Klokk et al., 2010) . Mo et al. (2015) develop a multistage decision model to analyse the time of introducing emission trading system, especially the effects on power plant CCS retrofit decisions, plant CO2 emissions and net present value (NPV). Carbon trading scheme is also addressed in the studies of supply chain optimisation (Chaabane et al., 2012; Giarola et al., 2012; Zakeri et al., 2015) . However, only one site or the total cost is minimised rather than considering the individual cost of each member within the carbon trading network. By applying carbon trading among power plants, the power plants can be taken as collaborative networks. All the power plants have their own objectives and constraints which make them compete with other power plants, but they will obtain better benefits via cooperation. In this work, we design a comprehensive integrated CCS infrastructure under carbon trading, which selects the CO2 resources (power plants) to be captured with available capture technologies and materials, and designs the transportation pipeline network to connect the resources with the sequestration and/or utilisation sites based on the work of Hasan et al. (2014) . The proposed MILP model decides whether it is beneficial for the CO2 resources to be involved into a CCS system or buy CO2 credits from other entities. Fair design of CCS infrastructure for power plants in Qatar is determined by determining the carbon trading price and the annual transferred amount among power plants under two fairness scenarios: same saving ratio and game theoretical Nash approach (Gjerdrum et al., 2001 ).
Mathematical model
In this work, a mathematical MILP optimisation model is developed for the fair design of 
CO2 balances
The CO2 emission balance for each power plant is given in Eq. (1), where the total emissions minus the carbon allowance, which is the amount the power plant needs to pay for, equals to the amount captured by the CCS system, carbon credit bought from abroad and other domestic power plants, minus the carbon credit sold abroad and to other domestic power plants. However, for each power plant, it is not allowed to sell carbon credits to other power plant before it reaches its own allowance level. Also carbon credits cannot be bought from other sites and sold to abroad at the same time. The binary variable i H is introduced to ensure that the above two conditions are satisfied by using the two constraints in Eq.(2) and (3).
Carbon trading
The carbon trading price is calculated based on the price selection among the available carbon trading price:
For each sink, no more than one transfer price level can be chosen:
The amount of carbon trading is the sum of amounts traded at each carbon trading price level k:
The upper bound for the amount of carbon trading transferred between sources is introduced, which limits the transferred amount from each carbon trading level.
Hence, the total carbon trading cost for each source is:
Total cost of each power plant
The cost of each power plant is calculated in Eq. (9), it equals to the overall cost of the carbon capture and storage system, which includes the total system cost, including the dehydration cost, carbon capture cost, CO2 transportation cost, CO2 injection cost, and international and domestic carbon trading cost, minus the overall system revenue, which is the international and domestic carbon trading revenue and CO2 utilisation revenue. The detail calculation of each cost term is given in Appendix A based on the CCUS model proposed in (Hasan et al., 2014) .
The total cost of all the power plants is calculated as below:
Power generation constraints
The CCS technologies are quite energy intensive, e.g. the process of chemical absorption with different solvents needs heat in the reboiler to heat up the solvent, provide heat for desorption and produce steam to strip CO2 from the solvent. Current post combustion capture technology will reduce the electricity output from power plants by about 20% (Lucquiaud and Gibbins, 2011; Peeters et al., 2007) . So when CCS is installed and operated, the total power generation rate would increase to cover the original power output, while the total power generation rate (including the energy consumption for the CCS) should be limited by the power plant designed capacity as:
Because of the energy consumption for CCS, more CO2 has been emitted based on the total power generation amount:
Objective functions
If only the total cost TC is minimised in Eq.(13) subject to the constraints in Eqs. (1)- (12) may not be distributed fairly and there is possibility that some power plant would sacrifice their own benefits to obtain the mutual benefits.
However, each single sink yields their own minimum costs and they will bargain for their own benefits, which requires an approach that produces a fair cost distribution subject to similar overall performance. In this work, fair cost distribution is obtained under two fairness scenarios: cost distribution with the same saving ratio and under game theory Nash approach.
Under the same saving ratio, the objective of the problem is to obtain the cost of each power plant close to the fixed target cost. The target cost of each power plant is determined by the ratio of cost savings compared with the current cost value max i C , which is obtained when no CCS system is available and all power plants bought carbon credits from the international market. C is obtained by minimising the total cost of the whole system while the CCS and carbon trading is allowed. In this way, the cost savings from utilising CCS and carbon trading is distributed with the same saving percentage.
The mathematical program in Eq.(16) should be solved subject to the constraints in Eqs. (1)- (12), (14), (15) Under game theory Nash approach, the objective is to maximise the product of the deviations of the given maximum cost of each sink. Each sink yields minimum cost while trying to maximise the objective value in Eq.(17).
Using the separable programming approach, the objective function is converted to: and 0. 
Power plants in Qatar
Qatar currently has 29 power plants, including 15 power plants consuming natural gas, 3 consuming oil and 1 using solar radiation (Enipedia, 2015) . In this work, 18 power plants are considered and their information is given in Appendix B. The  There are 9 locations available for CO2 sequestration, which avoid the agriculture areas and are selected based on population density in Qatar.  CO2 composition of flue gas from each power plant is among 4-10% (Hasan et al., 2014) . 
CCS infrastructure under Scenario 1: no domestic carbon trading
When the total cost is minimised in Eq. (13) subject to the constraints in Eqs. (1)- (12) and Eqs.(A.1)-(A.12), while no domestic carbon trading is allowed, the optimal CCS infrastructure is shown in Table 3 . Power plants 2 and 6 choose to have their own CCS, and they transport CO2 to sinks 8 and 6 individually. The source and sink matches are based on the distance between source and sink, shorter distance is preferred. The CCS technology and material selection is also given in the table, where absorption is selected with MEA as material for plant 2, while PSA with MVY is selected for power plant 6. For both power plants, 40% of their emissions are captured which are the amounts of CO2 over the assigned 17 carbon trading caps (70%). In total, 0.69 Mt/year CO2 has been captured, which includes the 30% emissions over the caps and the emissions from CCS utilisation. Furthermore, since the CCS capture efficiency is 90%, more emissions needs to be captured to cover the losses. All other power plants except these two power plants keep buying carbon credit from the international market rather than having their own CCS systems. The cost of each power plant is provided in Table 2 
CCS infrastructure under Scenario 2: with domestic carbon trading but no fairness concern
When the total cost is minimised in Eq. (13) subject to the constraints in Eqs. (1)- (12) and Eqs.(A.1)-(A.12), but domestic carbon trading is allowed, the optimal CCS infrastructure is shown in Table 3 . Power plants 1, 2 and 13 choose to have their own CCS. Sinks 9 and 8 are selected for CO2 storage. The three power plants choose to have the capture levels 100%, which are higher than the CO2 amounts they need to reduce. In total 2.62 Mt/year are captured with absorption and PSA technologies. The cost of each power plant is provided in the fourth column of 
CCS infrastructures under Scenario 3 and 4: with domestic carbon trading under fairness concerns
The developed MILP models for fair cost distribution are implemented using CPLEX 12.6.3.0 in GAMS 24.7.1 (www.gams.com) (Brooke et al., 2008) (1)- (12), (14), (15) and Eqs. (A.1)-(A.12), the optimal design of the CCS infrastructure with domestic carbon trading at the same saving ratio is obtained as presented in Table 3 .
Power plants 2, 3 and 6 choose to have CCS systems with capture level 100%. Power plant 2 and 3 select MEA as absorption material and transport the CO2 to sink 8. Power plant 6 selects PSA and transport the CO2 to sink 6. The total cost of the integrated CCS infrastructure is 146.60 M$/year, which is slightly higher than that from Scenario 2 (144.94
M$/year) and about 9% savings than that without domestic carbon trading under Scenario 1.
Under the proposed same saving ratio objective, the costs of all the power plants are distributed based on the same saving ratio as shown in the fifth column of Table 2 carbon trading amounts under different carbon trading prices. Fig. 7 presents the two infrastructures, for both scenarios some carbon credits have to be imported from abroad and power plant 2 and 6 are selected to install CCS and sell carbon credits to other power plants.
Meanwhile, sink 6 and 8 are the main reservoirs for CO2 storage. 
Concluding remarks
An MILP model has been proposed for the optimal design of integrated carbon capture, transport and storage infrastructure in Qatar. Under the carbon trading scheme, power plants with higher emission are promoted to invest on the CCS system with higher capture rate and the extra carbon credits can be sold to other power plants. In this way, higher CO2 capture rate can be obtained domestically rather than buying carbon credits from the international market. The power plants with CCS system can benefit from selling carbon credits and on the other hand the emissions of the other power plants can be limited within the assigned cap with lower expenses. It should be mentioned that the fairness metric used does affect the optimal design of the CCS infrastructure among the 18 power plants. In this work, two alternative fairness metrics have been investigated: same saving ratio and game theory Nash approach. Under scenarios 3 and 4, the total costs are slightly higher than that from minimising the total cost to obtain the fair cost distribution. The cost distributions among the power plants under the two fairness scenarios vary resulting from the selected CCS systems, carbon trading prices and transfer amounts between power plants. Three power plants determine to install CCS systems, while other power plants buy the carbon credits from those power plants or abroad to fulfil their carbon allowance requirements. Meanwhile, power plants with CCS systems obtain economic benefits by selling the credits.
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The future work includes pipeline network investigation, such as the location of pumps and connection of pipelines of different sizes. Other emitters, including refineries and chemical factories, can be added as sinks to CCS infrastructure under the carbon trading scheme.
Power generation distribution among power plants can also be considered since they have different carbon emission rates. Moreover, optimal CCS design under multi-period will be modelled based on minimising the total cost while considering the operating lives of sources and sinks at different time periods. The installation and operation of the components within the CCS infrastructure will be determined. Environmental issue can also be included to the optimal design of the integrated CCS infrastructure. The conversion from flue gas flow rate to CO2 mass flow rate is given below: 
